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


Big
Recovery
Portal

Analytical report

Reconstruction in Ukraine in 2022-2025: what does civil society monitoring tell us?

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Author:

Oleksandra Betliy, Leading Expert at IER

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1. Introduction

In June 2023, three civil society organizations (CSOs) – the Center for Economic Strategy, the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER), and the CSO “Technologies of Progress” – began implementing the Recovery Spending Watchdog project with financial support from the European Union. The initiative followed months of discussion and reflected a clear need for reconstruction monitoring. It aims to improve the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of state and donor funding at the local level.

Since the reconstruction takes place primarily on the ground, that is, in the regions, one of the components of the project was the grant program "Reconstruction Monitoring", which was administered by the IER in the period from January 2024 to October 2025. During this period, 35 CSOs monitored the reconstruction and recovery of 800 social infrastructure facilities. The results of these monitoring activities became the basis for writing this Analytical Report, which covers the reconstruction processes in 2022-2025 amid the full-scale war.


Analysis of the results of reconstruction is important given that most of the international experience is not relevant for Ukraine, where destruction has been present throughout the entire territory of the state for a long time. At the same time, reconstruction at this time is not just the removal of destruction, but the process of restoring the population's access to vital social services, including housing, medical care and education. The cornerstone of this process should be the principle of "build back better".

Civil society monitoring plays a critical role not only as an oversight tool but also as a mechanism for partnership and communication among public authorities, donors, and communities. The success stories identified provide important guidance for adjusting reconstruction processes both in the short term and in preparation for large-scale post-war reconstruction. Documenting failures and systemic violations also draws public attention and, in some cases, leads to project corrections and better-quality work. Relevant examples have been collected in a separate publication, [The Book of Success and Failure Stories from Ukraine's Reconstruction in 2022–2025](#).

This Analytical Report aims to be a practical guide for stakeholders, helping to shape approaches to large-scale reconstruction where every step is effective, accountable and aimed at creating a safe and comfortable environment for all citizens. Reconstruction must be people-centered, and therefore take place according to the principle of "build back better".

Section 2 provides key information about the Reconstruction Monitoring grant program. Section 3 describes the principal data sources for reconstruction and recovery and their limitations, since effective monitoring is impossible without reliable data. Section 4 presents the main findings on planning and prioritization, public engagement and

awareness, transparency, accessibility, and energy efficiency. The report closes with conclusions and lessons for large-scale reconstruction.



2. Grant Program "Reconstruction Monitoring"

Civil society monitoring is an integral part of reconstruction and recovery and helps make financing more efficient and transparent.

During the period from January 2024 to October 2025, 35 CSOs participated in the grant program "[Reconstruction Monitoring](#)", which was administered by IER within the framework of the project "Recovery Spending Watchdog".

The grant program supported reconstruction monitoring through two competitions:

Competition 1: Monitoring of reconstruction and recovery on the ground: social infrastructure facilities.

Competition 2: Monitoring of procurement for reconstruction and recovery on the ground: social infrastructure facilities.

In total, there were seven waves of competitions. The projects lasted an average of four months.

In both competitions, the subject of monitoring was primarily the process of reconstruction and recovery of social infrastructure facilities after partial damage or complete destruction from February 24, 2022.

Social infrastructure facilities:

- Educational institutions (preschools, schools, technical vocational schools, institutions of higher education);
- Institutions of the health care system (primary and specialized care institutions);
- Cultural institutions (libraries, theaters, museums, etc.);
- Residential buildings;
- Administrative buildings, including local-government premises and Administrative Service Centers (TsNAPs).

The grant competition aims to engage national and local CSOs in monitoring reconstruction and recovery at the local level, thereby improving the efficiency of reconstruction spending and project implementation.

Because recovery and reconstruction lack clear statutory definitions, the competitions used terminology proposed in late 2023 in a draft recovery law that was never submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine:

- **reconstruction** of immovable property and infrastructure (hereinafter, reconstruction) – activities involving the reconstruction, restoration, major repair, or routine repair of damaged immovable property and infrastructure; the construction of new property and infrastructure where critically damaged or destroyed facilities cannot be reconstructed, restored, or repaired; and other measures undertaken to recover the territory;
- **recovery** of Ukraine, a region, a settlement, part of a settlement, or a territory (hereinafter, recovery) – activities aimed at overcoming the consequences of the Russian Federation’s armed aggression in all spheres of public life within the relevant territory.

With this in mind, the monitoring included shelters and a number of institutions that did not suffer significant damage and destruction during the full-scale war.

Civil society monitoring followed the methodology adopted for the grant program. The methodology differed slightly between the competitions (see Table 1). The first two components were the same in both competitions, while the subsequent components for monitoring the reconstruction of social infrastructure facilities differed between Competitions 1 and 2.

Monitoring involved completing a facility profile and a questionnaire about the reconstruction project. The completed profile and monitoring questionnaire were uploaded to the Big Recovery Portal. This analytical report is based on the completed questionnaires.

Table 1: Components of monitoring the reconstruction of social infrastructure facilities

Competition 1: Monitoring of reconstruction and recovery on the ground	Competition 2: Monitoring procurement for reconstruction and recovery on the ground
Preparation of a facility profile	
Assessment of the community’s approach to planning the facility’s recovery and initiating and approving the reconstruction project under review	
<i>Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the reconstruction project</i>	<i>Planning and design monitoring</i>
	<i>Monitoring of procurement and contracting procedures</i>

In total, CSOs monitored approximately 800 facilities across 10 oblasts of Ukraine – Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts – as well as the city of Kyiv.

Reconstruction and recovery monitoring was a new area of work for all participating organizations. To strengthen CSO monitoring capacity, IER therefore delivered approximately 20 webinars based on the project methodology.¹



¹Trainings and webinars: http://www.ier.com.ua/ua/Recovery_Spending_Watchdog/Trainings

3. Open data for reconstruction monitoring

3.1. Open data and public information requests

High-quality civil society monitoring of reconstruction and recovery depends on accessible data – an ongoing challenge for CSOs participating in the Reconstruction Monitoring grant program. Open state registers and portals are particularly important because they provide information on damage, project planning and implementation, public procurement, and actual expenditure. Key components of this ecosystem include the Register of Damaged and Destroyed Property (RPZM), the Prozorro public procurement system, the Unified Web Portal for the Use of Public Funds (Spending.gov.ua), the Unified State Electronic System in the Construction Sector (USESC), and the DREAM digital ecosystem. Together, these systems should make it possible to trace the reconstruction “life cycle”: from recording destruction in the RPZM and planning projects in DREAM to procurement through Prozorro, payments through Spending.gov.ua, and confirmation of a project’s legal construction status in USESC.

All of these platforms have limitations (see below). The RPZM, however, is entirely closed to users for “security reasons,” although it was originally intended to be open.²

Because open data have limitations and gaps, public-information requests to relevant authorities are essential for reconstruction monitoring. CSOs also submitted information requests to donors and contractors. Effective requests must clearly specify the period, facility, required level of detail, and funding sources or programs so that the responses clarify rather than confuse. Such requests are often necessary both to verify open data and to fill information gaps.

During a full-scale war, authorities in some places refer to restrictions on access to information and, in response to requests from CSOs, often state that they cannot provide data for security and defense reasons. This creates additional barriers to reconstruction monitoring. There were cases when authorities refused to provide project and estimate documentation (PED) in electronic form and offered to scan the documents for a separate payment. At the same time, refusals to provide data also came from donors in the case of financing reconstruction projects by donors and charitable organizations.

The following subsections take a closer look at the main open data platforms used by CSOs for civil society monitoring of reconstruction: Prozorro, Spending, USESC, and

²At the same time, it is not entirely clear why the Register is closed at least for social infrastructure facilities.

DREAM, as well as their capabilities and limitations in terms of civil society monitoring of the country's recovery.

3.2. *Prozorro – public procurement system*

Prozorro is an electronic public procurement system through which customers of all levels (state authorities, local self-government bodies, state and communal enterprises) conduct tenders for the purchase of goods, works and services. The system is built on the principles of "everyone sees everything" and has an open API that allows data to be uploaded in a machine-readable format for analytics and public control

For reconstruction monitoring, Prozorro provides an opportunity to track the entire procurement cycle for reconstruction and construction projects: announcement of procurement plans, tender documentation, participants' offers, auction protocols, signed contracts and changes to them. Key details are available: the customer and the supplier (EDRPOU, name, address), expected value and amount of the contract, CPV classifier, description of the subject of procurement, terms of execution, sometimes - geographical reference (region, community). Through these data, monitoring CSOs can, for example, form samples for construction works, road repairs, purchase of building materials, compare competition and prices in different regions, identify potential risks (few participants, suspicious price increases, etc.).

Importantly, due to the lack of a specific code for reconstruction and recovery projects, the overall analysis of procurement for the reconstruction and recovery of destroyed and damaged facilities is complicated. According to the codes, there is information specifically on construction, which includes a much wider list of works and services.

Limitations of Prozorro for reconstruction monitoring:

- Not all reconstruction spending is subject to competitive bidding; some procurement may follow simplified wartime procedures or take place outside Prozorro. In such cases, signed contracts are uploaded to the portal, often with only basic information. The announced procurement may not be documented, making it difficult to identify the funding source for the purchase.
- The system provides very limited information on the actual performance and quality of work. It contains contracts and supplementary agreements but does not offer a complete picture of implementation stages or recovery progress.
- The data may contain errors: customers do not always correctly fill in CPV codes, descriptions, geography, which complicates the automatic filtering of "reconstruction" procurement.
- The decision adopted by the Parliament on the publication of estimates did not correct the situation with transparency and clarity of data, since only estimates are published. On the other hand, it does not allow tenderers to estimate the estimated volumes of work and materials, which are often subject to abuse and manipulation. The resolution

of this issue should be facilitated by the changes regarding pricing approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which should facilitate the creation of a codifier of construction materials, as well as a register of prices for construction materials.

3.3. Spending – Unified Web Portal for the Use of Public Funds

Spending provides access to information on the actual use of public funds, including transactions, contracts, reports, and supporting documents from administrators and recipients of state and local budgets, state special-purpose funds, and state-owned and municipal enterprises.³ The portal forms part of the broader **E-Data** platform, which includes modules such as Open Budget and ProFI and is designed to increase public-finance transparency.

Through the web interface and public API, it is possible to search for information by managers, recipients, dates, amounts and purpose of payment.

This platform is important for reconstruction monitoring because it shows payments already made – the actual flow of funds. CSOs can analyze transactions involving earmarked subventions (targeted transfers) to local authorities for reconstruction and recovery projects, as well as payments for related work and services. This includes construction, design work, materials, and equipment, and makes it possible to track expenditure by period, region, or counterparty. Available transaction details include the creation, approval, and payment dates; amount; payer and recipient (identified by EDRPOU code); a summary of the payment purpose; and, for many transactions, links to related contracts and reports.

At the same time, Spending.gov.ua has a number of limitations as a tool for reconstruction monitoring:

- Accountants enter payment-purpose descriptions manually, so the data may be unstructured and contain abbreviations or internal codes that complicate automated classification. Transactions often have to be reviewed individually, and the funding source cannot always be identified reliably.
- Unlike Prozorro, there are no CPV codes when marking transactions, and reference to specific tenders or contracts may be absent or inconsistent. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) has been discussing the introduction of an eContract for several years, which will ensure the exchange of data between the two systems and help avoid errors (so far, CSOs have noted that there were errors when the payment was made to an organization with a different EDRPOU than to the winner of the procurement).

³At the same time, the portal currently does not publish transactions related to the defense and security sector, which, however, includes all transactions of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Justice.

- Some administrators upload incomplete data despite their formal publication obligations. Transactions involving international assistance or off-budget funds may also be only partially displayed.

For a complete analysis of reconstruction costs, it is advisable to combine Spending.gov.ua data with Prozorro, DREAM and other sources.

3.4. USESC - Unified State Electronic System in the Construction Sector

USESC (the e-Construction portal) is a state electronic system that creates, collects, processes, and provides construction-sector information and enables electronic interaction among construction clients, designers, public authorities, and Administrative Service Centers (TsNAPs).

The public USESC portal contains registers of construction activities, a facility map, analytics modules, and search services. Users can view permits, declarations, construction documentation, and mapped facilities and can download open datasets through data.gov.ua.

For reconstruction monitoring, USESC shows the legal status of construction projects: which facilities have permits for new construction, reconstruction, or major repairs; the contracting authority and contractor; key facility parameters such as address, area, and consequence class; and the current construction stage. USESC data complement Prozorro procurement records and Spending.gov.ua payment data, providing a fuller picture of reconstruction progress.

USESC was less familiar and less intuitive to CSOs, so they used it less frequently than Prozorro or Spending.gov.ua. The system has several limitations for civil society reconstruction monitoring:

- No financial data, such as project costs or funding sources, are publicly available; USESC must therefore be combined with other registers to analyze both financing and facilities.
- For automated analytics, additional efforts are needed to clean and unify addresses and identifiers in order to correctly link USESC with data from Prozorro, Spending.gov.ua and DREAM.

3.5. DREAM

DREAM was initially established as a state digital recovery ecosystem (Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management). In 2023 and 2024, its establishment and operation were governed by an experimental resolution of the CMU. Local authorities were therefore not required to enter their reconstruction and recovery projects into the system, so the coverage of community projects primarily reflected their willingness to submit projects to DREAM. The system was designed to collect, organize,

and publish data on recovery projects at every stage – from concept and preparation to implementation and results monitoring. However, the available information depended heavily on project initiators updating the records consistently. Some portal entries contained errors because there was no accountability for inaccurate data, and DREAM lacked a data-verification mechanism.

At the same time, already in 2024 and 2025, the system began to be used for submitting and selecting projects for financing individual programs from the State Budget. These are programs for financing shelters and school kitchens, reconstruction and recovery projects at the expense of the European Investment Bank, and distribution of financing from the State Fund for Regional Development (SFRD).

From 2025, DREAM becomes a public investment management system. The development of the system is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine and the DREAM Project Office with the support of international partners, in particular the Open Contracting Partnership and in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy.

The DREAM public portal (dream.gov.ua) offers several key modules: an interactive map of recovery projects, [an analytics module](#), public project profiles, and a [user academy](#). The map displays each project's location (community and oblast), facility type (housing, social infrastructure, transport, energy, etc.), implementation stage, and estimated cost. The analytics module generates breakdowns by oblast, sector, funding source, and contracting authority. Project profiles include the problem statement, objective, expected results, funding sources, responsible authority, contractors, and links to related registers and systems such as Prozorro.

The portal already contains the state Unified Project Portfolio (UPP) and has added community UPPs. DREAM automatically evaluates projects against government-defined criteria.

During the grant program, DREAM was important as the only consolidated – though incomplete and unverified – database of reconstruction and recovery projects. It is now becoming the digital foundation of public investment management (PIM) reform and should eventually enable funds and projects to be tracked from planning through implementation and reporting, increasing transparency for citizens, donors, and businesses.

However, DREAM also has limitations that are important to consider during civil society monitoring:

- The system remains under active development. Some modules, data-validation processes, and integrations with other registers are still being finalized, which may result in gaps, duplicate records, or technical errors.

- DREAM analytics during the pilot phase were not official statistics and therefore had to be used in conjunction with other sources, which are also limited.
- Some DREAM records did not reflect the actual situation and consequently confused CSO monitors, sometimes because project-implementation statuses had not been updated.

The available open data are therefore sufficient for CSOs to monitor reconstruction and recovery. However, each open-data system has limitations that monitors need to understand. At present, effective monitoring is difficult, if not impossible, without submitting numerous information requests.

3.6. Open-Data Dashboards on Reconstruction

Because working with open data requires specialist skills, verification is time-consuming, and information requests often go unanswered, the dashboards developed by the Center for Fiscal Policy Research under the [Cost of War](#) project have become useful reconstruction data sources.

Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression⁴: This interactive map presents information on expenditures at the expense of the Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression for 2023 and 2024 (excluding the security and defense sector and critical infrastructure).

The Center also created a database of the Fund's expenditures for 2023-2024 and a database of procurement from the funds of the Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression (2023-2024).

Local-budget expenditure on recovery⁵: This is the first structured database covering local-budget spending on recovery under dedicated programs for housing, schools, hospitals, and other facilities. It contains data for 2023–2024 on more than 1,300 facilities, with total expenditure exceeding UAH 1.6 billion. Each record includes an address, facility type, geospatial data, and verified expenditure figures, revealing how funds are distributed across regions and how community priorities differ.

⁴Dashboard <https://fiscalcenter.org/liquidationfund/>;

Video instructions for the dashboard <https://youtu.be/v9B2diiFOL4>;

Expenditure database <https://fiscalcenter.org/news/vydatky-fondu-likvidatsii-u-2024-rotsi-vidkryta-baza-danykh/>; Procurement database <https://fiscalcenter.org/news/fund-liquidation-procurement-database/>;

⁵Dashboard <https://fiscalcenter.org/project/local-budget-recovery/>;

Expenditure Database https://fiscalcenter.org/news/local_recovery_data_2023-2024/;

Procurement database <https://fiscalcenter.org/news/fund-liquidation-procurement-database/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExV0d1MDU3b3lLYTAyZ0gxeAEeWw7F0XB0pHoS3BjIjHGwGbN->

iMW5HMYZGm2fWioIqEviylgvs9G78SWO5Q_aem_1hVaGRGmF4KjkwWZgcyaVg<https://fiscalcenter.org/news/local-budget-prozorro-2023-2024/>.

Partner funding (EIB):⁶ This database covers more than UAH 2 billion in expenditure during 2022–2024. It consolidates all available data on European Investment Bank funding and state- and local-budget co-financing under two programs supporting the reconstruction of housing and social and critical infrastructure in Ukraine:

- Emergency credit program for the recovery of Ukraine;
- Program for the recovery of Ukraine.

A limitation of these datasets is the time required to collect and verify the underlying data. There is therefore a noticeable delay between expenditure and the publication of verified figures on the Center’s website. The Ministry of Development now publishes comparable dashboards monthly.



⁶Dashboard <https://fiscalcenter.org/international-map>
Expenditure Database <https://fiscalcenter.org/news/eib-recovery-data-2022-2024/>
Procurement database <https://bit.ly/4nQvgzU>

4. The main conclusions of the monitoring

4.1. Planning and prioritization

Analysis of monitoring materials shows that the process of planning and prioritization of reconstruction projects in Ukraine differs between territorial communities (TC) and often depends on the capacity and transparency of a specific community or regional administration. In only 22% of cases, CSOs noted that the project approval process was transparent and open.

In general, the situation with planning documents improved during 2022-2025. After the decision of the CMU on the need to develop and adopt comprehensive recovery programs (CRP) and recovery plans⁷, the process of preparing such documents began at the end of 2023 and continued actively in 2024. The corresponding activity was supported by a number of donor projects, and CSOs were also involved in the process. CRP cover the social sphere, including health, education and housing, and often declare defined approaches to prioritization.

At the same time, already from the end of 2024, the existence of such plans and programs began to lose their importance, as the approach changed: strategies for the development of territorial communities became more important for the allocation of funds. Thus, in order to participate in competitions for financing from the funds of the European Investment Bank (which are allocated through the budget), the presence of a strategy has become important. Currently, communities are revising their strategies in view of updating the State Strategy for Regional Development in 2024 and regional strategies.

Another drawback of the planning process is the lack of updated territorial development plans: in 2025, the parliament again postponed the mandatory preparation of comprehensive spatial development plans. Their absence does not allow high-quality and efficient planning of reconstruction and recovery.

In general, CSOs that monitored reconstruction reported the presence of significant gaps in strategic planning, which creates risks of unsystematic reconstruction. At the same time, the key challenge was and remains the lack of clear, formalized criteria for assessing the priority of projects, as provided by regulatory documents.

⁷[Resolution](#) of the CMU No. 1159 dated 14.10.2022 "On the approval of the Procedure for the development, holding of public discussion, approval of programs for the comprehensive recovery of the region, the territory of the territorial community (part thereof) and making changes to them"; [Resolution](#) of the CMU No. 731 dated 18.07.2023 "On the approval of procedures for the recovery and development of regions and territorial communities".

At the state level, in the fall of 2023, the Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine adopted a methodology for prioritizing projects financed by the Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression.⁸ The Fund was the largest budget program financing reconstruction and recovery in 2023, and its remaining balance financed reconstruction and recovery projects in 2024. However, not all Fund resources were allocated according to the prioritization methodology. The methodology applied only to the Fund, while other financing streams used different prioritization approaches. Moreover, several Fund-financed projects already had project and estimate documentation (PED) dating from 2021 and were therefore not specifically related to addressing the consequences of the war.

In the Serhiyivska settlement council, but not only there, for example, they declared the recovery of "everything in parallel", without dividing the school and the residential building by priority.

In 2024 and 2025, state-level approaches to prioritization changed as part of public investment management reform. The government established clear project-evaluation criteria intended to guide reconstruction priorities, although EIB-funded programs use different criteria. The reform will also change how reconstruction and recovery priorities are set locally. By the end of 2025, communities must adopt medium-term investment priorities and unified project portfolios; the quality of these documents is likely to vary, primarily because communities have different capacities.

In many cases, recovery decisions were made administratively, without proper competitive selection among other damaged facilities. Also, public opinion was not taken into account in 70% of cases. For example, some objects in Zaporizhzhia (in particular, shelters) were selected based on the results of the premises survey, but did not undergo prioritization and evaluation procedures. For some projects initiated by donors, the procedure of local prioritization or competitive selection was not carried out. In other cases, priorities were formed on the basis of the technical condition of damaged buildings, the number of appeals from residents and the availability of technical reports.

In general, civil society monitoring shows that the priority is the need to restore basic social functions and return the population:

1. Housing is critical for the return of the population, especially young families. Residential building recovery projects in Zaporizhzhia, Irpin, Bucha and Kharkiv were given high priority.
2. Education (schools, kindergartens) is necessary for the stabilization of life and the return of families, ensuring the continuity of the educational process. It was the most

⁸[Order](#) of the Ministry of Development No. 964 of October 20, 2023 "On the approval of methodological recommendations regarding the prioritization of projects to eliminate the consequences caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine."

financed area in Poltava Oblast (disclaimer: the conclusion is based on the results of monitoring, which do not cover all regions and all objects). Schools and shelters are being actively restored (for example, shelters in schools in Chernihiv Oblast and Zaporizhzhia).

3. Health care (hospitals, clinics) is important for ensuring access to basic health services. Hospitals from Kharkiv, Trostyanets, etc. were monitored.

One of the biggest obstacles in planning is the financial capacity of communities to update development plans and develop new approaches. “Plans and project documentation are expensive. This is beyond the community’s means.”

One consequence of unsystematic and poorly coordinated planning was the recovery of educational institutions without shelters. As a result, some kindergartens and schools have renovated, high-quality premises but cannot provide in-person education because they lack shelters. In some places, in-person classes continue only after parents sign statements confirming that they understand and accept the risks.

Also, despite the general availability of plans, their implementation is often delayed due to delays in funding or personnel problems (for example, the mobilization of contract teams).

4.2. Public involvement and awareness

Public involvement in reconstruction processes is often partial or formal in nature.

In most cases, the monitoring recorded that public opinion assessment was not carried out at the stage of project preparation. As a rule, citizens were presented with a fait accompli: they learned of the work plan only after it had been approved or after the work had already been completed.

Involvement of the public is often not provided at all when discussing the priorities of reconstruction and recovery of social infrastructure facilities. At the same time, the lack of communication during the reconstruction of housing after damage and destruction was also surprising. Thus, decisions were often made without involving the affected residents, and they could not get information from either the customer or the contractor.

Thus, one of the many examples of lack of involvement was the Buchansk community, where no information was found about public hearings or the involvement of experts in the development of plans for the recovery of residential buildings. Residents of the affected housing in Kyiv complained that the communication took place through the management company, and it was information, not evaluation of opinions. In Odesa, the residents of the damaged building were not even involved in the inspection procedure by the commission, which determined the method of reconstruction. But in fact, such a problem existed in most communities where monitoring took place.

Some contracting authorities cited the absence of a statutory requirement to hold public hearings during recovery work on damaged residential buildings and social infrastructure facilities. Contractors were more willing to provide information and cooperate where condominium associations had been established. In many cases, residents of damaged apartment buildings created such associations specifically to influence housing reconstruction. Interaction with contracting authorities and contractors remained difficult, but the associations at least created a channel for dialogue.

The consequences of such a closed process of planning and prioritization of reconstruction and recovery are:

- Lack of public buy-in. Thus, decisions on reconstruction are made by authorities without feedback, which creates the risk of not taking into account the interests and opinions of the final beneficiaries.
- Inconsistency with needs, when they forget to take into account the interests of certain groups of people (in particular, it is about accessibility).
- Loss of trust, as insufficient communication creates a risk of loss of trust in reconstruction and recovery processes on the ground.

Despite the presence of official platforms such as Prozorro, DREAM and BRP, public access to complete and systematic information remains limited. This creates a situation of "partial transparency", when funds can be tracked, but real progress and quality control of works is complicated.

The problem extends beyond involving residents and civil society in reconstruction and recovery. Managers of the institutions being rebuilt or restored are not always consulted either; in some cases, they are asked only superficial questions, such as their preferred wall color. This occurs whether a project is initiated by a community, a regional authority, a donor, or a charitable organization. Reconstruction therefore often defaults to restoring things “as they were,” even though consulting institution managers could support improved layouts, workflows, and other operational changes.

At the same time, information about reconstruction and recovery is often limited on the ground:

- Access to financial and organizational information (contracts, contractors, payment amounts) is provided by Prozorro and Spending, but the information is often unclear to a wide range of citizens without special knowledge. At the same time, due to the frequent use of direct (non-competitive) contracts, there is a general lack of understanding of the requirements for announced tenders.
- Data published in mass media and social networks are often of a news or overview nature, not replacing official, detailed reports.

- communities actively used DREAM to submit their projects, but often the information was incomplete, sometimes with errors.
- There are often no publicly available design and costing documents (PCDs), detailed estimates or records of completed works, which are critical for reconstruction monitoring and recovery.
- Communities often do not publish their rationale for selecting specific sites for recovery, their needs assessment methodology, or prioritization.

Despite the general problems, positive examples were also recorded when information was available, published on Prozorro as tender and PED announcements, and the community promptly and timely reported on reconstruction.

4.3. Sources of funding for reconstruction and recovery

Reconstruction in Ukraine is financed from a wide range of sources, making it difficult to identify the correct funding source for individual facilities. Information requests often have to be submitted for verification.

The main source of funding remains the State Budget, but the importance of budget programs has changed. Thus, in 2023 and 2024, an important source of financing for reconstruction was the budget program "Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression". At the same time, according to the Center for Fiscal Policy Research, of the 41.6 billion UAH allocated to finance projects in communities, only 24.6 billion UAH were used. This calls into question communities' capacity to absorb and implement funds on schedule. In 2023, the delay in implementation was related to the peculiarities of budgeting in Ukraine: funds from the Fund were allocated late enough, and therefore communities did not have time to implement projects by the end of the year and had to return the money. In 2024, communities again received carry-over funds but again failed to spend them in full. In 2024 and 2025, another source of the State Budget for reconstruction is a loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB). In 2025, the government also allocated UAH 1 billion to projects at the expense of another State Budget program - the State Fund for Regional Development (SFRD). Funds from all these and other programs of the State Budget are allocated to places in the form of earmarked subventions (targeted transfers). At the same time, the corresponding decisions of the CMU, which allocate earmarked subventions to places, do not contain the names of projects and more detailed information about the allocation of funds. Therefore, for the needs of reconstruction monitoring, it is necessary to compare the relevant earmarked subventions with information from other sources, and today DREAM is very helpful in this.

Local budgets are also an important source of financing reconstruction and recovery. This applies primarily to urgent reconstruction and emergency recovery works. Also, local

budgets must co-finance projects for which funds are allocated from various programs of the State Budget.

CSO monitoring showed that international donors and charitable organizations play an important role in financing operational recovery, emergency assistance, and longer-term projects. These include UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP, which finance reconstruction projects including shelters and kindergartens, and the International Organization for Migration, which has financed housing reconstruction under individual projects. Other active donors include United24, the French foundation Mécénat Servier, Finn Church Aid (FCA), International Medical Corps, the Red Cross Society, ACTED, and others.

Monitoring has shown that funding delays are frequent. Thus, cases were identified when projects that were supposed to be completed are delayed due to a lack of funds, in particular for additional financing. Thus, the cost of about 30% of the projects, the reconstruction of which was monitored by CSOs, increased. An important problem was the lack of personnel, when the contractor had to extend the deadlines of the projects due to the mobilization of employees. In general, about 30% of the objects were not handed over within the predetermined time.

One reconstruction initiative that appeared highly promising but was delayed by funding shortages and legal issues was the comprehensive recovery project in Posad-Pokrovske, Kherson Oblast, led by the Agency for Restoration of Ukraine. Legal obstacles included the absence of formal land allocations and cadastral numbers and, consequently, unresolved ownership rights for the de facto owners of private houses.

Sometimes, CSOs noted the risk of double funding and discrepancies between declared and actual funding. Although the majority of monitoring did not reveal direct duplication of funding (about 86% of facilities), discrepancies in data on sources of funding between the DREAM (donor) and Prozorro (budgetary) systems were recorded. In some cases, the differences were also related to the declared amounts of financing of the contracts (when the actual financing was significantly higher than that declared for DREAM).

At the same time, there is a risk of double funding because reconstruction and recovery are sometimes financed from several sources. In a number of cases, the absence of detailed information on the full cost estimate or certificates of completed work – even when Prozorro contains payment data – made it difficult to determine whether double funding had occurred or whether funds had been spent efficiently. Separate projects and cost estimates were also sometimes created for different types of work at the same facility, such as roof repairs, window replacement, and facade repairs. In this way, institution owners – local authorities – sought to secure more funding to restore the institutions' functionality.

4.4. Prozorro Lacks Transparency

Procurement monitoring revealed that the principles of competitiveness and transparency in Prozorro are violated or circumvented, which creates the risk of corruption and inefficient use of budget funds.

In an all-out war, competition in public procurement is limited and non-competitive procedures are common. Thus, by its decision, the government introduced the possibility of conducting public procurement with special features in the conditions of martial law. Cases of using direct (non-competitive) contracts were quite frequent. We are talking about procurement (especially for project works, author's and technical supervision) without using the Prozorro electronic system. Although it is legally allowed (simplified procurement), it can be seen as avoiding public scrutiny.

Contracts under direct (non-competitive) contracts for the preparation of PED and the implementation of construction works are submitted by contracting authorities to the Prozorro website. But the problem is that very often for such projects there are no PED or other documents that make it clear what is behind the purchase, what are the main requirements, what are the sources of funding.

Procurement monitoring revealed risks of material cost overestimation compared to market prices. Problems arise due to insufficient clarity of the estimate part of the project regarding the definition of the type of materials, which makes it difficult to compare prices. The lack of publication of detailed resource information and estimates in open access makes it impossible to independently verify prices. In part, these issues should be resolved within the framework of the CMU resolution on pricing.

CSOs often pointed out problematic contractors and corruption risks. In particular, the facts of the involvement of companies that appear in journalistic anti-corruption investigations and criminal proceedings were revealed. Risks associated with project organizations that have a significant share of non-competitive contracts with the customer were also identified.

Audits by the State Audit Service of Ukraine (SASU) in some cases confirmed violations or the need to remove discriminatory conditions. In some cases, contract values decreased following the audits rather than increasing.

4.5. Accessibility Remains Elusive

The accessibility principle is mandatory during reconstruction based on the principle of "build back better". However, the general picture recorded by the monitoring shows only partial compliance of the objects with accessibility requirements.

CSOs monitoring reconstruction at the local level found that only 17% of facilities met accessibility requirements, while another 42% met them partially. The assessment covered physical accessibility, primarily wheelchair access, including ramps, lifts, and adequate door and entrance widths. For example, lifting devices for persons with reduced mobility (PRM) are being installed at Berezhneuvate Hospital. A Chernihiv school has installed lifts and provided an accessible restroom in its shelter. Accessible restrooms remain a significant challenge: even where they exist, particularly in schools, they are often kept locked. In some locations, ramps and sufficiently wide doors are available, but the restrooms still fail to meet accessibility standards.

The largest gaps relate to decision complexity and sensory accessibility, which is critical for individuals with visual, hearing, and cognitive impairments. Notably, many facilities lack Braille signage, tactile navigation elements, contrasting markings, or clear evacuation plans.

Even when accessibility features are present, they may not comply with national building standards (DBN). For example, a ramp may be installed at an incorrect slope or without handrails on both sides.

The "illusion" of accessible housing became the biggest challenge during reconstruction. In practice, ramps are rarely, if ever, installed in residential buildings. At the same time, the reconstruction of high-rise buildings has shown that accessible solutions can often differ between entrances, as residents can independently finance accessibility elements, such as a ramp (Kharkiv region, Kyiv region). At sites where recovery was carried out without consultation with residents (Odesa), new physical barriers were created, making access, in particular, to the shelter, unsafe.

At the same time, accessibility is "forgotten" even in the construction of destroyed private housing. For example, private one-story houses in the project of Complex reconstruction of residential buildings in the city of Irpin are built with several steps, and the width of the door opening is 90 cm, and therefore the houses initially become unsuitable for people in wheelchairs.

Importantly, very often shelters are not accessible to people in wheelchairs. As a result, this category of people actually has no right to protection during shelling. Sometimes the stairs to shelters in schools are very abrupt, and therefore children can be hurt if they quickly enter the shelter during an alarm. Instead, there are already cases when gentle descents (without stairs) into the shelter are made, and one of the entrances is equipped with an elevator or lift.

Monitoring in the Irpin community revealed that the accessibility problem is exacerbated by stereotypical ideas among planners and heads of institutions, who believe that special measures are not needed, because "there will not be such children here." This demonstrates that **inclusiveness requires not only funding, but also a change in consciousness**. At the same time, if we talk about educational institutions, it is not only

about children, but also about their parents and effective parenting, as well as about the possibility of a person in a wheelchair to work in such an institution.

Overall, CSOs became local advocates for accessibility during the monitoring process. In some places, the absence of accessibility appeared to result more from a failure to consider it than from deliberate obstruction. Accessibility features were also sometimes present but failed to meet applicable standards: good intentions alone did not guarantee good outcomes.

In general, the monitoring showed that it is necessary to work on changing approaches and philosophies with all participants in the reconstruction and recovery process. In particular, it is about ensuring the correct width of the door, the absence of thresholds in the door frame, etc.

Importantly, an accessible facility is useful only if persons with reduced mobility (PRM) can actually reach it. Some CSOs noted that wheelchair users could reach the relevant institution only by private car. Accessibility therefore requires genuinely accessible routes, supported by clear communication and justification, as well as suitable public transport.

4.6. Energy Efficiency Is Costly but Essential

Facilities generally comply only partially with energy-efficiency requirements. Design firms must meet the minimum requirements established by DBN.

Monitoring has shown that the vast majority of reconstruction and recovery projects are focused on local, economically beneficial measures that do not constitute complex thermal modernization.

Indeed, double- and triple-glazed energy-efficient windows are now being installed at scale. In some cases (as in Kryvyi Rih), the windows purchased in fact turned out to be more energy efficient than required by the project documentation, although in some places the situation is different. It is important that the situation has improved since 2022, when neither donors nor authorities paid attention to the energy efficiency class of windows.

Relatively often, partial insulation of facades or the attic floor was performed (for example, in the "Barvinok" kindergarten). However, there is no comprehensive facade thermal insulation of the main buildings, for example, the Chernihiv hospital or residential buildings. It is interesting that during the recovery of individual apartment buildings in the city of Kyiv, insulation work was initially laid, but then it was not done and reports were made on cost savings.

Although many facilities have undergone improvements, they remain far from meeting today's 'build back better' standards. Solar panels were installed at only a few

institutions, and battery storage was considered even more rarely – for example, for Building 2 of Chernihiv Polytechnic, while the other buildings remained unchanged.

Generators are widely used as backup sources, but this does not replace complete energy independence. At the same time, their presence is important, in particular, for the functioning of educational institutions during a blackout. Prolonged power outages put the operation of some underground schools in the Zaporizhzhia region at risk, as the backup generator did not meet all needs.

A positive step is the installation of individual heat substations (IHSs) with automatic regulation (Chernihiv Hospital, Novobasan School, Chernihiv Polytechnic University), although these are still rare cases of reconstruction.

Achieving full energy efficiency is costly. Even after several measures are implemented, most facilities attain only a basic energy-efficiency rating.

It is precisely because of the cost, regardless of the customer and the source of financing, that energy efficiency is often rejected. Few people take into account the long-term effects, such as lower expenses for the maintenance of institutions after reconstruction.

An unbalanced approach to energy efficiency creates operational risks. If the project involves only electric heating, this endangers stable operation in the event of a long-term power outage, even with the presence of a generator.

Although there are positive examples of a systemic approach to energy conservation, in general, retrofitting is often limited to the minimum necessary measures, leaving the need for full-scale thermal modernization and integration of renewable energy sources (RES) as a priority for future investments.

4.7. Civil Society Monitoring: Partnership or Control

CSO monitoring was intended to examine how reconstruction and recovery were implemented locally, promote better and more efficient reconstruction, and improve the use of public funds. Because both the reconstruction and recovery process and its monitoring are new to many stakeholders in Ukraine, partnerships among CSOs, public authorities, and institution managers became particularly important.

CSOs were able to recommend accessibility features for reconstruction and recovery projects and emphasize the need for energy-efficient solutions. Only joint efforts can ensure compliance with the ‘build back better’ principle.

In particular, in Irpin, monitoring helped identify systemic barriers, which eventually forced the city management to change its attitude to the problem, to initiate the installation of elevators and accessible toilets. In the Kharkiv Regional Children's Clinical

Hospital, on the basis of analytical support, it is planned to integrate recommendations on energy efficiency and accessibility into technical tasks for future repairs.



5. Conclusions

The analysis revealed several systemic problems requiring attention. It focused on critical aspects of reconstruction: planning and prioritization, transparency in public procurement through Prozorro, public engagement and awareness, accessibility, and energy efficiency. Recovery is often accompanied by opaque decision-making, limited procurement competition, and risks of inflated construction-material prices. Although digital platforms such as DREAM, Prozorro, and Spending.gov.ua provide basic access to data, the information is fragmented and requires substantial verification. Project and estimate documentation (PED) and other important records are frequently unavailable, requiring CSOs to submit public-information requests. In some locations, such requests are denied on security grounds during the full-scale war in ways that appear more consistent with manipulation or misuse of restrictions.

The analysis also found that the fundamental “build back better” principle is often ignored or implemented only partially, particularly with regard to accessibility and energy efficiency. For example, fewer than one fifth of the facilities fully meet accessibility requirements.

More specifically, the analysis of civil society monitoring results for social infrastructure reconstruction in 2022–2025 supports the following conclusions.

First of all, the reconstruction process often takes place in conditions of limited coordination and transparency, where each actor tries to quickly implement his part of the work, which leads to chaos and inefficiency.

Although many communities have developed or are in the process of developing Comprehensive Recovery Programs (CRPs), only 22% of cases have demonstrated a transparent and open project approval process. There is an acute problem of the financial and personnel inability of communities (especially small ones) to independently ensure the development of planning documents. Prioritization often occurs not on the basis of clear evaluation methods, but administratively or as a result of urgency and pressure. A critical consequence of this is the recovery of educational institutions without the presence of shelters, which makes it impossible for them to function fully in the offline mode.

Involvement in project planning and approval is mostly absent or formal. Citizens often do not have the opportunity to influence decisions at the initiation stage, which leads to their needs not being taken into account.

Reconstruction often combines funds from state and local budgets, as well as significant support from international donors. Although direct cases of duplication of funding were found to be minimal, insufficient coordination and fragmented data create risks of inefficient use of resources.

Procurement and public information processes have systemic gaps, which increases corruption risks. The dominant practice is to avoid competitive procedures (direct (non-competitive) contracts or bidding with one bidder), although this is permitted by law in times of war. This leads to the risks of overpricing of construction materials and equipment and the involvement of contractors with dubious reputations.

Access to key information is only partial. Customers often do not publish a complete package of tender and project and estimate documentation (PED), including resource information and acts of completed works, which makes proper financial audit and public verification of prices impossible.

Despite frequent references to the “build back better” principle, implementation remains fragmented. Only 17% of the monitored facilities fully met accessibility requirements. Attention focuses mainly on physical barriers such as ramps and wide doors, yet even these features often fail to comply with DBN, for example because ramps have an incorrect slope or lack handrails. Sensory accessibility – including tactile navigation, Braille signage, and call buttons – is systematically overlooked. Many rebuilt facilities, including shelters, remain inaccessible to persons with reduced mobility (PRM).

Energy-efficiency measures are generally limited to basic interventions, such as replacing windows with energy-efficient units and partially insulating roofs. Comprehensive thermal modernization of facades, heat pumps, and heat-recovery systems are often absent. Although many facilities have generators, these support energy independence rather than energy efficiency. There are positive examples of using RES, such as solar panels, and IHSs, but these solutions are not yet widespread.

Therefore, the reconstruction process depicted in the monitoring materials is similar to the construction of a large, urgent puzzle in the dark. Each player (government, donors, contractors) has a part of the picture and seeks to quickly put its element.

Planning and prioritization are like assembling a complete picture. Without an approved plan and uniform criteria, the pieces are placed haphazardly: one actor rebuilds housing, another a school, and a third a shelter, with no coordination and decisions driven by intuition or whichever demand is voiced most loudly.

“Prozorro Lacks Transparency”: when procurement takes place in the dark – through direct (non-competitive) contracts or concealed cost estimates – it becomes easier to overpay for substandard work or goods.

Accessibility and energy efficiency are comparable to the finishing and lighting required for a complete project: they are often postponed because they are costly and treated as non-essential, even though a facility is only partially functional without them.

At the same time, Involvement of the public is the inclusion of puzzle owners in the process, so that they can confirm that the element fits and that it is really needed, and not just bought “because they decided so”.

6. Lessons for Large-Scale Reconstruction

Summarizing the results of civil society monitoring for the years 2022–2025 allows us to highlight important lessons that should be taken into account to ensure the effective, transparent and sustainable reconstruction of Ukraine in the future. This experience shows the need to strengthen institutions, as well as to adhere to the principle of people-centeredness.

Above all, planning should not be chaotic or reactive, driven only by an urgent need. Systemic gaps were identified where the recovery of critical facilities (such as schools) was not synchronized with critical security needs (such as shelter construction), resulting in the impossibility of their full offline use. Future reconstruction should be based on clear, formalized criteria for evaluating the priority of projects. It is important that the reconstruction in the future is based on the updated Territorial Development Strategies and the adopted comprehensive spatial development plans. Only such an approach will allow us to coordinate efforts and move from a fragmented approach to reconstruction to a comprehensive and holistic one.

It is necessary to ensure the transparency of public procurement, since it is in this component that civil society monitoring has revealed numerous systemic violations that create high corruption risks. Some of these gaps should be corrected by the effective implementation of the new regulation of the CMU on pricing, but this will take time.

At the same time, it is important to realize that excessive use of simplified procedures (direct (non-competitive) contracts) or open tenders with features where only one participant participates has become the norm. This minimizes savings and leads to inflated prices for construction materials and services. Future policy should maximize competition and limit non-competitive procurement to exceptional cases. It is also important to have information about procurement from the announcement of the procurement to the payment and commissioning of the facilities.

The principle "build back better" often remains only a declaration. The monitoring conclusions indicate the need to implement these standards not as an option, but as a mandatory component:

Accessibility in social infrastructure cannot be reduced to ramps, which themselves often fail to meet DBN requirements. A comprehensive approach should include tactile navigation, Braille signage, accessible restrooms, and safe evacuation routes to shelters using elevators or lifts. Contracting authorities, facility managers, design engineers, technical-supervision specialists, and builders all need to change their underlying approach. Civil society can continue to act as a driver and advocate for accessible solutions.

Energy efficiency must be an integral element of the reconstruction in the future. It is necessary to invest in thermal modernization of facades, insulation of roofs and integration of renewable energy sources (RES) and autonomous power systems. This approach not only reduces operating costs, but also increases the resilience of social infrastructure in the face of military risks.

It is important to consider the opinion of users. The formality of public involvement (informing instead of consulting) leads to unaddressed needs. Successful cases demonstrate that constructive dialogue with the community and end beneficiaries (community, parents, staff) in the early stages of planning ensures higher quality and greater satisfaction with the results.

CSO monitoring did not cover another important dimension of the ‘build back better’ principle: environmental sustainability. For large-scale reconstruction, it will be important to develop criteria for assessing compliance with this dimension as well.



Institute for Economic Research
and Policy Consulting (IER)

St. Reitarska, 8/5-A, 01030 Kyiv

Tel. (+38044) 278-6342

E-mail: institute@ier.kyiv.ua

<http://www.ier.com.ua>

